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Quantity rationing of credit, when some ￿rms are denied loans, has macroeconomics e⁄ects not
fully captured by measures of borrowing costs. This paper develops a monetary DSGE model with
quantity rationing and derives a Phillips Curve relation where in￿ ation dynamics depend on cyclical
unemployment, a risk premium and the fraction of ￿rms receiving ￿nancing. Unemployment arising
from disruptions in credit ￿ ows is de￿ned to be cyclical. GMM estimates using data from a survey of
bank managers con￿rms the importance of these variables for in￿ ation dynamics.
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11 Introduction
The idea that ￿nancial factors a⁄ect the supply sector of the macroeconomy is not controversial. Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) derive and give supporting empirical evidence for a Phillips curve where an interest rate
contributes to ￿rm costs. However, a recurrent theme in discussions about the role of credit markets1 is
that borrowing costs do not give a complete picture, and changes in quantity rationing, when some ￿rms are
denied loans, plays an important role.
The present work derives a Phillips Curve from a monetary DSGE model with quantity rationing of
credit. Cyclical2 unemployment is de￿ned to be unemployment that arises due to disruptions in credit
￿ ows. The resulting Phillips Curve has the standard New Keynesian form where marginal cost is a function
of cyclical unemployment, a risk premium, and the fraction of ￿rms that are not quantity rationed.
Firms have heterogeneous needs for ￿nancing their wage bills and must take collateralized loans to
meet them. If the collateral requirement is su¢ ciently strict, some ￿rms do not get ￿nancing. The
parameter representing ￿rm￿ s ability to provide collateral represents credit market conditions and has a
natural empirical proxy in the survey of bank managers from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Using
this data, estimations show a signi￿cant role for all the variables in the theoretical speci￿cation of the Phillips
Curve and demonstrate that ignoring quantity rationing of credit constitutes a serious mis-speci￿cation.
Removing the survey data eliminates the role of cyclical unemployment and makes forward looking in￿ ation
expectations appear to be more important.
There are similarities with the present approach and that of Blanchard and Gali (2007), where involuntary
unemployment arises due to real wage stickiness. They provide empirical evidence for a Phillips Curve
where unemployment and producer price in￿ ation represent marginal cost. However, real wage rigidities
are temporary and cannot explain persistent unemployment. Credit market ￿ aws are a leading candidate
for the underlying cause of persistent unemployment of a type that policymakers might want to minimize.
There are a number of other models of unemployment based on labor market imperfections that can
explain sustained unemployment, search models such as Mortenson and Pissarides (1994) being the dominant
approach. Alternatively, the cost of monitoring workers (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) or implicit contracts
(Azariadis, 1975) can increase the marginal cost of labor and lower the equilibrium level of labor, which have
been interpreted as involuntary unemployment. While these may all be important factors in the level of
unemployment, whether changes in these frictions are closely connected to changes in cyclical (involuntary)
unemployment is questionable. Recessions are not caused by an increase in monitoring costs, for example.
The importance of quantity rationing has been emphasized in the literature from a number of di⁄erent
1Lown and Morgan (2006) is one example, and they give a number of references including Blanchard and Fisher (1981).
2The somewhat normative phrase "involuntary unemployment" is also used in this context.
2perspectives. There is little empirical evidence for borrowing costs being important determinants of ￿ uc-
tuations in inventories and output (Kayshap, Stein and Wilcox 1994). Lown and Morgan (2006) provide
evidence, using the loan o¢ cer survey data, that lending standards are signi￿cantly correlated with aggre-
gate lending and real output. Boissay (2001) shows that quantity rationing acts as a signi￿cant ￿nancial
accelerator of ￿ uctuations in a real business cycle model. The framework presented here borrows some of
the modeling language from this approach.
A number of papers develop DSGE models that include ￿nancial intermediaries whose lending is con-
strained by frictions arising from agency restrictions such as net worth (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997, Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1996), monitoring costs (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) or collateral constraints (Mona-
celli 2009). Faia and Monacelli (2008) is related in that ￿rms borrowing is a⁄ected by idiosyncratic shocks.
In their approach, the monitoring costs vary across ￿rms and only a fraction of intermediaries participate,
while in the present work there is a representative intermediary and a fraction of ￿rms receives ￿nancing.
Recently, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2009) have developed sophisticated models
based on the net worth approach that allow for analysis of monetary policy when the zero lower bound on
interest rates might bind to model ￿nancial crises.
As noted above, the ￿nancial frictions in the work referenced here all take the form of price rationing. A
notable exception is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which has a collateral constraint that varies endogenously
with economic conditions, giving rise to multiple steady states. While the approach in the present work is
much simpler, it allows for easy comparison with other policy related models and empirical work.
2 The model
Following standard New Keynesian approaches, there is nominal stickiness in that monopolistic competitors
do not all set prices at the same time. The primary departure of this model from standard approaches is
the introduction of a working capital requirement for ￿rms.
2.1 Demand for intermediate goods
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competitors and produce di⁄erentiated goods yt (i) and set




















The parameter ￿ > 1 represents the degree of complementarity for inputs in production and goods for
consumption. Final goods producers maximize pro￿ts PtYt ￿
R 1
0 pt (i)yt (i)di where Pt is the ￿nal goods
price. Optimizing (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) or Walsh (2003)) yields the following condition
on the demand for intermediate goods.
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2.2 Working capital requirement
The formulation of the model focuses on the role of quantity rationing of credit. The primary innovation of
the model is the heterogeneity of ￿rms in the need for ￿nancing a portion of their wage bill, embodied in the
variable vt which has distribution F (vt) over [0;1]. This variable could represent di⁄erences in ￿rms internal
￿nancial resources or the timing of their cash ￿ ows. If a ￿rm is unable to get ￿nancing, it does not produce
that period3. An individual ￿rm with draw vt, producing good i, has ￿nancing need ￿ (vt;i) = Wtl(vt;i)vt
where Wt is the nominal wage, and l(vt) is the labor demand for a producing ￿rm. Firms are wage takers
so Wt is the wage for all ￿rms. If the ￿rm gets ￿nancing, it produces output yt (vt;i) = atlt (vt;i)
￿ where
at is the level of productivity and ￿ is the usual Cobb-Douglas production parameter with values between
zero and one.
Firms cannot commit to repayment of loans and so must provide collateral in the form of period t
output. The collateral condition is ￿tpt (i)yt (vt;i) ￿ (1 + rt)￿ (vt;i) where the interest rate is rt and the
￿t is the fraction of cash ￿ ow the intermediary accepts as collateral. The productivity shock at and need for
￿nancing vt are both realized at the beginning of period t, so the intermediary does not face any uncertainty
in the lending decision. Substituting for yt (vt;i) and ￿ (vt;i) yields the following form for the collateral
3A more natural assumption would be that some ￿rms or portions of ￿rms are able to produce without ￿nancing each period.
The present approach is chosen to simplify the exposition.
4requirement.
￿tatlt (vt;i)




The exogenous process ￿t represents the aggregate credit market conditions embodied in the collateral
requirements made by banks and ￿rms￿ability to meet them. A sudden fall in con￿dence, such as the
collapse of the commercial paper market in the Fall of 2008, could be represented by an exogenous drop4 in
￿.
Pro￿t for an individual ￿rm with realization vt producing good i for its ￿nancing need is the following.
￿t (vt;i) = pt (i)atlt (vt;i)
￿ ￿ Wtlt (vt;i) ￿ rtWtlt (vt;i)vt





(1 + rtvt): (3)
Using the labor demand relation, the collateral constraint (2) becomes ￿t (1 + rtvt) ￿ ￿(1 + rt)vt. From
this condition, we can de￿ne vt, the maximum vt above which ￿rms cannot produce. For ￿rms to produce
in period t, they must have a vt such that






(1 + rt) ￿ rt
￿￿1)
: (4)
Note that the fraction of ￿rms producing vt is increasing in the credit market con￿dence parameter ￿t. At
an interior value for vt < 1, it must be the case that ￿ < ￿, which implies that the fraction of ￿rms producing
is decreasing in the interest rate.
For the present speci￿cation, changes in the fraction of ￿rms receiving ￿nancing vt are driven primarily
by ￿ uctuations in exogenous credit market conditions. While this is not necessarily unrealistic, there are
many potential extensions of the model where the variable vt would depend on other endogenous quantities.
For example, ￿nancing could be required for investment goods and capital used as collateral, so ￿ uctuations
in capital levels would a⁄ect the fraction of ￿rms receiving ￿nancing. One advantage of the form of equation
(4) is the fraction vt depends on real factors, so we can isolate the impact of quantity rationing on in￿ ation
dynamics.
In its present form, the collateral requirement does not act as an accelerator of other shocks such as
productivity. Productivity is included here primarily for comparison with related models.
4Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) model the start of the crisis as a deterioration of the value of assets held by ￿nancial interme-
diaries.
52.3 Households
The household optimization problem is closely related to standard approaches such as Ravenna and Walsh
(2006), but the fraction of non-rationed ￿rms a⁄ects ￿rm pro￿ts received by the household and the aggregate
quantity lent by intermediaries. The household chooses optimal levels of consumption Ct, labor supplied Lt
























PtCt + Dt + Mt ￿ (1 + rt)Dt + Mt￿1 + WtLt +
Z vt
0
￿tdF (vt) + Gt
The household is assumed to insure against labor market ￿ uctuations internally, as in Gertler and Karadi
(2009), for one example. Households hold shares in all ￿rms and receive pro￿ts from producing ￿rms
R vt
0 ￿tdF (vt). They also receive pro￿ts Gt from the intermediary where Gt = Dt ￿Dt (1 + rt)+rt￿
e
t +Mt,
where Mt is the monetary injection made by the central bank each period. Households borrow Dt at
the beginning of period t and repay (1 + rt)Dt at the end. The timing is typical of models that formally
include a ￿nancial sector, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for example. The amount of lending to ￿rms



















First order conditions from the household optimization problem yield standard consumption Euler and
labor-leisure relations.










2.4 Aggregate output, labor and ￿nancing cost
Finding an expression for marginal cost at both the industry and aggregate levels is a primary goal, which
requires aggregating ￿rm level variables in the pro￿t function. The level of output and labor for ￿rms
producing good i are speci￿ed naturally, given that some ￿rms may not be producing due to quantity
6rationing.








lt (vt;i)dF (vt) (10)
Using labor demand (3) to substitute for lt (vt;i) in the aggregate labor equation (10) and integrating
determines the following aggregate labor demand equation assuming that vt is distributed uniformly over

















































When the production function parameter ￿ is such that ￿ > 1
2, aggregate labor and output are both
increasing in vt for a given wage. Using the above two equations, aggregate output and labor can be related
as follows.




The cost for the representative ￿rm depends on the wage bill and the aggregate quantity of ￿nancing
￿
e
t (i); which is derived using labor demand (3) to substitute for lt (vt;i) in the aggregate lending relation




































3 Phillps Curve derivation
3.1 Marginal cost
The standard derivation for a Phillips Curve relation focuses on marginal cost. Firms that make the same
good i have the price and wage, so there is a representative cost minimization problems for those ￿rms. The









t (i), which is minimized subject to the production constraint (13) for a given

































Production decisions are made independently of ￿rms￿ability to update prices, so in equilibrium yt (i) = Yt

















In models without ￿nancial factors, the term f￿g in (15) is simply a
￿1
t . The qualitative impact of productivity
is the same here, but marginal cost depends on price and quantity rationing of credit as well.




t J (at;rt;vt) (16)










This equation de￿nes a steady state relationship for
￿
e L;e a;e r;e v
￿
, recalling that the steady state and ￿ exible
price level of marginal cost depends solely on the pricing power of the monopolistically competitive ￿rms
such that e ’ =
￿ ￿ 1
￿
: The fraction of non-rationed ￿rms and the interest rate have intuitive roles.
Proposition 1 The function J (at;rt;vt) in (16) is increasing in vt for ￿ > 1
2 and ￿ > 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 and the aggregate labor relation (11) imply that an easing of credit standards that allows
more ￿rms to enter leads to higher aggregate marginal cost. In addition to the usual increasing marginal
cost intuition, an increase in vt allows higher marginal cost ￿rms to produce.
The relationship between the interest rate and marginal cost is more complicated. Whether the function
J (at;rt;vt) and aggregate labor demand lt (i) from (11) are increasing in rt is sensitive to parameter choices,
but for natural selections marginal cost rises with borrowing costs as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
3.2 Price stickiness
To study in￿ ation dynamics, we assume prices are sticky in that only a fraction of ￿rms can update their
prices in a given period. The convention in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) produces a Phillips
curve where in￿ ation depends on both expected and lagged in￿ ation, which is more empirically realistic5,
than the relation without lagged in￿ ation that results from Calvo (1983) updating. In the former "dynamic
optimization" approach, a fraction 1-! of ￿rms are able to re-optimize their prices each period, while the
￿rms that cannot re-optimize set
pt (j) = ￿
%
t￿1pt￿1 (j);
where in￿ ation is ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1 and % 2 [0;1] represents the degree of price indexation. Re-optimizing ￿rms
maximize discounted expected future pro￿ts taking into account the possibility of future price revisions.
Cogley and Sbordone (2006) derive the following form for the Phillips curve where b ￿t and b ’t are percentage
(log di⁄erence) deviations from the steady state values. The following form is standard in the literature,
5Inclucing lagged in￿ation has empirical support unless one allows for a time varying trend in in￿ation as in.Cogley and
Sbordone (2006), which is discussed at the end of the next section.
9though it is a special case of their derivation where steady state in￿ ation is constant at zero. In the







Etb ￿t+1 + ￿b ’t (17)
for ￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿!)(1 ￿ !)
(1 + ￿%)(1 + ￿!)!
One strategy for estimating the Phillips Curve (19) is to use labor cost data as a proxy for marginal
cost b ’t as in Sbordone (2002), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), which
has had success in explaining in￿ ation dynamics. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) develop a New Keynesian
model with borrowing to pay the wage bill and derive a Phillips Curve that includes an interest rate. They
demonstrate the empirical relevance of ￿nancial factors by estimating a Phillips Curve with unit labor costs
and the interest rate representing marginal cost.
3.3 Unemployment
The analysis here focuses on the labor market and its relation to ￿nancial factors. Cyclical unemployment
is de￿ned here as unemployment that arises due to disruptions in credit markets. To this end, we de￿ne the
natural levels of endogenous variables separately from ￿ exible price levels.







￿ the ￿exible price levels X
f
t are such that X
f
t = Xtjfpt (i) = Pt = 1;8tg;
￿ the natural levels Xn
t are such that Xn
t = Xtj
n
vt = e v;pt (i) = Pt = 1;8t
o
,
￿ cyclical unemployment Uc
t is such that Uc
t = Ln
t ￿ Lt, and
￿ natural unemployment Un
t is such that Un
t = e L ￿ Ln
t :
Hence, cyclical unemployment arises due to quantity rationing, the failure of some ￿rms to receive credit
compared to the steady state, and the failure of prices to adjust. Natural unemployment arises due to
deviations in productivity at from its steady state value e a. In related models without quantity rationing
such as Ravenna and Walsh (2006), there is no distinction between natural and ￿ exible price levels.
So far, there is nothing to prevent cyclical unemployment from falling below zero. While negative cyclical
unemployment might seem counter-intuitive to some, it could model a situation where unemployment falls
below normal levels due to excess credit ￿ ows. With the additional assumption that all ￿rms receive
10￿nancing in the steady state, e v = 1, cyclical unemployment would be positive always. Such an assumption
is not necessary for the succeeding analysis but is left as a possible option in future work.
Marginal cost depends on cyclical unemployment. Linearizing the marginal cost equation (16) gives the
following.
b ’t = ￿b Lt + ￿ab at + ￿rb rt + ￿vb vt
for ￿ = 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
One can also use equation (16) to express a relation between natural levels and linearize to ￿nd
0 = ￿b Ln
t + ￿ab at + ￿rb rn
t
The fraction of unrationed ￿rms does not appear, since credit market ￿ uctuations do not a⁄ect natural
levels. The zero on the left hand side arises, since the marginal cost is constant under ￿ exible prices, and
for natural levels as well as a consequence. Subtracting the equation linearizing around the natural levels
from the previous linearization yields
b ’t = ￿￿b Uc
t + ￿r (b rt ￿ b rn
t ) + ￿vb vt: (18)
The parameters ￿;￿r and ￿v are all positive for reasonable parameter choices, see the proof and discussion
of Proposition 1. The spread b rt ￿ b rn
t represents the di⁄erence the interest rate that assumes normal credit
￿ ows and one that does not. Therefore, the spread is a risk premium due to the possible disruption of credit
￿ ows to ￿rms.
Combining this representation of marginal cost with equation (17), gives the Phillips Curve relation that
is the focus of the empirical analysis.
b ￿t = ￿￿1b ￿t￿1 + ￿1Etb ￿t+1 ￿ ￿U b Uc
t + ￿
0
r (b rt ￿ b rn









￿U = ￿￿; ￿
0
r = ￿￿r; ￿
0
v = ￿￿v
In￿ ation dynamics are speci￿ed as usual in the New Keynesian approach, but marginal cost is replaced by
cyclical unemployment and ￿nancial factors.
11The roles of all the variables are intuitive. Unemployment and in￿ ation have an inverse relationship as
in the original Phillips Curve. The cost of borrowing impacts marginal cost and in￿ ation, as in Ravenna
and Walsh (2006). An easing of credit standards, meaning a rise in ￿t, leads to an increase in b vt, which
also pushes up marginal cost, since production rises and ￿rms with higher marginal costs are able to enter.
The importance of these factors independently or in combination are issues to be addressed empirically.
4 Empirical Evidence
Estimation of the Phillips Curve (19) veri￿es that cyclical unemployment, borrowing costs and credit market
standards are important factors in in￿ ation dynamics. Cyclical unemployment and the interest rate spread
representing borrowing costs have economically signi￿cant impacts on in￿ ation in the way speci￿ed by
the model. Credit market standards, as measured by the N.Y. Fed survey of bank managers, also plays
a signi￿cant role, and omitting this variable can seriously bias the estimates of the other parameters. In
particular, ignoring credit market standards makes in￿ ation appear to be more dependent on forward looking
behavior.
For the estimation of the Phillips Curve (19), the data on in￿ ation is the standard log di⁄erence of the
GDP de￿ ator, but the speci￿cation of the other variables requires a few details. The empirical analysis
focuses on U.S. Data for the sample 1990Q2 to 2010Q4 coinciding with the most recent continuous reporting
of the N.Y. Fed survey of bank managers. This measure of con￿dence is a proxy for the credit market
conditions parameter ￿t, the primary determinant of the fraction of ￿rms with ￿nancing vt: The survey
data is the fraction of bank managers who report an easing of lending standards over the previous quarter6.
De￿nition 2 suggests that the data series for natural unemployment should be constructed by removing the
￿ uctuations in employment caused by productivity. However, the empirical relationship between aggregate
labor market quantities such as hours worked and productivity is an unsettled issue in the literature, see
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2003) and Francis and Ramey (2009) for example. Furthermore,
Canova, Lopez-Salido and Michelacci (2010) report that neutral technology shocks, such as the ones in the
present model, have little impact on labor when long cycle ￿ uctuations are removed from the data.
For this work, we sidestep these issues and follow Gali￿ s (2011) development of a wage Phillips Curve
by assuming a constant natural rate. Two alternative speci￿cations using the natural rate estimate of the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) and a natural rate obtained by detrending are also examined. There are
more sophisticated methods for measuring the natural rate using other data, but dealing with the potential
6See Lown and Morgan (2006) for a detailed description of the survey data. They present standards as the percentage of
manager reporting a tightening. Strictly speaking, the data in the present work is the percentage that do not report tighter
standards.
12interaction of the that data with the variables used to estimate (19) is a large econometric problem beyond
the scope of the present work.
The risk premium in the Phillips Curve speci￿cation (19) is represented by spread between the yields
on corporate BAA bonds and the 10 year Treasury, both bonds of similar maturity. In their VAR analysis
using the bank manager survey data, Lown and Morgan (2006) use a short term spread between commercial
paper and T-bill rates, and we check our results for this spread at a maturity of six months. Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) use the spread between the ten year and three month bond yields, but such a term premium,
as opposed to a risk premium, is inappropriate for the model developed here.
Estimates are obtained with the GMM7 using lags of the independent variables as instruments. The
choice of instruments, four lags of in￿ ation, cyclical unemployment, credit market conditions and the interest
rate spread, is similar in approach to Blanchard and Gali (2007). The informativeness of the instruments is
veri￿ed by inspecting the F-statistics for the OLS regression of the instruments on the independent variables.
The smallest value for the F-statistic is 24.1 exceeding the minimum of 10, recommended by Stock, Wright
and Yogo (2002).
The central empirical results are the estimates of the Phillips Curve (19) parameters in Table 1. The
J-statistic is the measure of ￿t, and the associated p-value tests the null that the over-identifying restrictions
are satis￿ed.
Table 1





0.63160 0.26909 -0.06316 0.35342 0.02074 -2.28309 4.9318
(0.0000) (0.0060) (0.0313) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8936)
0.45781 0.40008 0.00787 0.095904 0.06235 6.76317
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6925) (0.0000) (0.7013) (0.8179)
GMM estimates for (19) where the natural rate of unemployment is constant.
The ￿rst line reports estimates of (19) with all variables included. The ￿t is good, and all the coe¢ cients
are signi￿cant. The estimate on cyclical unemployment b ￿U = ￿0:06 is lower than the estimate of -0.20 from
Blanchard and Gali (2007), who use a di⁄erent speci￿cation and sample8, but is still economically relevant.
The sign on b ￿
0
v is correct according to the theoretical model. An easing of credit market standards is
associated with an increase in the con￿dence parameter ￿t and the fraction of ￿rms receiving ￿nancing vt.
7The covariance matrices are generated by the variable bandwith method of Newey and West.
8In particlar, their sample is for 1960-2004 and includes the value of a non-produced input.
13While the economic content of the magnitude of b ￿
0
v is di¢ cult to interpret directly, it is highly statistically
signi￿cant. When the credit market conditions series is removed in the second estimation, the estimates of
the coe¢ cient on unemployment is no longer statistically signi￿cant, the coe¢ cient on the spread is much
smaller and the forward looking component of in￿ ation is larger. Comparison of these two estimations
give strong evidence for the connection between quantity rationing of credit and cyclical unemployment. A
reason for the failure of some estimations of Phillips Curves with unemployment may have been the omission
of ￿nancial factors. Furthermore, forward looking behavior plays a smaller role when the ￿nancial market
factors are included.
Table 2 shows estimates similar to those in Table 1 with an alternative de￿nition of cyclical unemployment.
Here, the variable b Uc
t is represented by the di⁄erence between the unemployment rate and the natural rate
of unemployment published by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. According to De￿nition 2, the natural
rate of unemployment should be uncorrelated with credit market conditions. Granger causality test reject
any correlation between this measure of natural unemployment and credit market conditions with p-values
0.4277 and 0.1925 for each direction of causality.
Table 2





0.61580 0.28340 -0.07472 0.34050 0.01744 -2.23891 5.81802
(0.0000) (0.0036) (0.0151) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8303)
0.37552 0.43505 -0.02416 -0.06984 0.20911 6.54728
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3429) (0.0006) (0.0352) (0.8345)
GMM estimates for (19) where the natural rate of unemployment taken from the CBO.
The results are very similar to those using a constant natural rate of unemployment (Table 1). When
the credit market conditions variable is removed, b ￿U is no longer signi￿cant, and, in this case, neither is b ￿
0
r:
The change in the importance of in￿ ation expectations with the removal of the survey data is even more
dramatic. In all the estimations, if the data on credit market conditions is removed as instruments and as
an independent variable, the estimates of b ￿
0
r become statistically insigni￿cant.
A third speci￿cation of the natural rate of unemployment is obtained through detrending. Cyclical
unemployment is the di⁄erence between the unemployment rate9 and the trend created with the Hodrick-
Prescott ￿lter with a high smoothing parameter (￿ = 10;000), as in Shimer (2005), since lower values create
9Besides the survey data from the N.Y. Fed, all other data come from the St. Louis Fed database.
14excess variation in the natural rate represented by the trend. For example, with the value ￿ = 1600, there
is no cyclical unemployment by 2010Q4, when other studies (Weidner and Williams 2011) with di⁄erent
methodology estimate it to be 2% at minimum. The results for this speci￿cation are in Table 3.
Table 3





0.68444 0.343929 -0.08506 0.32884 -0.01683 -2.16500 6.59383
(0.0000) (0.1237) (0.0289) (0.0044) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.7722)
0.31822 0.50255 0.04261 0.06042 0.23350 6.06353
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0830) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.8691)
GMM estimates for (19) where the natural rate of unemployment is obtained by detrending.
The results are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2, though the estimate of b ￿U is larger and quite close to
the estimate in Blanchard and Gali (2007). These estimates must be treated with caution; however, since
the detrended speci￿cation for natural unemployment is correlated with the credit market conditions data.
The results indicate that expectations are not as important to in￿ ation dynamics as previously thought.
While the coe¢ cient on expected in￿ ation in other GMM estimates of the a Phillips curve (Gali, Gertler,
Lopez-Salido (2001), Blanchard and Gali (2007) are typically above 0.6, the estimates of ￿1 are below 0.4
when credit market conditions are taken into account. These results suggest that ignoring ￿nancial factors
gives an upward bias to the coe¢ cients on forward looking variables, but more evidence is needed before this
conjecture is accepted over alternative explanations.
There are two major alternative approaches to modeling and estimating the Phillips Curve. Blanchard
and Gali (2007) impose real wage rigidity, which allows them to de￿ne involuntary unemployment and gen-
erate in￿ ation persistence without price indexation. Their estimation results concerning the importance of
unemployment are similar to the ￿ndings in the present work. Their estimates also show signi￿cant persis-
tence, though expectations play a more important role in their estimations. The connection between real
wage rigidity and unemployment is intuitive though the persistence of the e⁄ect is questionable. Developing
a model with both wage rigidity and ￿nancial frictions is a promising avenue for future work.
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) estimate a Phillips curve with time varying trend in￿ ation, using unit labor
cost as a proxy for marginal cost. With a time varying trend, in￿ ation is much less persistent.. Linearizing
around a constant trend is defensible for the sample 1990-2010, when the credibility of the Federal Reserve
was high. In contrast, trend in￿ ation shows large variations in the results of Cogley and Sbordone (2008).
15An additional issue is their assumption of a constant trend for marginal cost, which may be less appropriate
than a constant trend for in￿ ation. Estimating a model with both ￿nancial factors and time varying variables
is another import area for research to reconcile these results.
5 Conclusion
In￿ ation dynamics depend on ￿nancial factors including both borrowing costs and quantity rationing of
credit, as demonstrated by the theoretical model based on heterogeneous ￿rm need for ￿nancing and esti-
mation of the resulting Phillips curve using data for a risk premium and credit market conditions. Cyclical
unemployment is de￿ned as the unemployment arising due to a disruption in credit ￿ ows, and it has an
intuitive relationship with in￿ ation.
The approach presented here has implications for future theoretical and policy work. The heterogeneity
in the need for ￿nancing could apply to ￿nancing of investment purchases or consumption. The distinction
of cyclical unemployment from natural unemployment based on quantity rationing of credit has important
implications for the proper unemployment target for policymakers. Furthermore, the connection between the
credit and labor markets demonstrates the potential use of non-traditional policy interventions in ￿nancial
markets to stabilize aggregate variables.
Appendix
The expression for the aggregate ￿nancing cost (14) is obtained by substituting for lt (vt;i) in the aggre-
gate lending relation (6), using the labor demand equation (3), where F (vt) = vt.
￿
e









vt (1 + rtvt)
1
￿￿1 dvt
Integration by parts is used to obtain a solution for the integral expression above.
Z vt
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Substituting the expression for the integral back into the above expression for ￿
e
t (i) yields the relation (14).
The proof of Proposition 1 follows.
16Proof. From equation (16), the derivative of J (￿) with respect to vt is
d
dvt






























The functions ￿(￿), #(￿), and ￿(￿) are all positive by construction, so the above ratios of these functions
must be positive as well. Given the assumption in proposition 1 that ￿ > 1, if the signs of the derivatives
inside f￿g are both positive, then the sign of d
dvtJ (￿) is positive.
The sign of
dJ(￿)
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For ￿ > 1
2, (1 + rtvt)
￿
￿￿1 < 1. Furthermore, the term (1 + rtvt)
￿1 is also less than one so the [￿] term above























1￿￿ ￿￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)r
￿1


































, noting that 1￿￿
2￿￿1 < 0. Hence, the f￿g term in the above






￿(￿) > 0 as well.
Therefore, both derivatives in the expression for
d
dvt
J (￿) above are positive, which implies that J (￿) is
increasing in vt, as required.
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